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Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190014-6
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-014

REFER

19 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

FROM:

Chairman

SUBJECT: Revision of DCIDs 1/7 and 1/20

Attached for your review are the draft revisions of DCID 1/7 and 1/20 reported by the Compartmentation Subcommittee following their consideration of NSA comments on the earlier draft revisions. Please complete the blocks below with regard to the attached drafts and return this sheet to me by 11 February 1983.

Attachment: DCID 1/20

Agency or Department CIA

Date

11 FEB. 1982

Concur

Noncon

Comments or reasons for nonconcurrence

SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT
LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN THE DOCUMENT.

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Re objections to revision of "DCID 1/20"

He reportedly is concerned about the requirement in the "DCID" for all SCI-accessed persons to get a defensive security briefing before traveling to a Communist or otherwise hostile country. He is said to doubt that such is necessary and to question whether Chiefs of Station can arrange for this overseas.

The particular requirement involved is in the current DCID 1/20, which took effect 6 June 1978. Bob Gambino made the presentation to the NFIB on that DCID, and was thoroughly conversant with it. Hence that requirement was well known to OS at the time the requirement became DCI policy. The requirement remained through the two iterations that the Compartmentation Subcommittee did. CIA was represented throughout the subcommittee deliberations. So much for the administrative background. As for substance, the DCID (and its draft non-DCID format successor) leaves to the discretion of SOICs how they will provide for these defensive security briefings. is making an unsupported assumption ~~about~~ that there is an inflexible burden involved. ~~the~~ The intentional silence in the document on the "how to" aspects makes it perfectly permissible for the defensive briefing to be administered by mail, by a variety of personnel, etc. There is no requirement in the "DCID" that the COS administer such a briefing to overseas types. I would hope that the agency recognizes the need to provide some sort of defensive briefing for its personnel before they travel to Communist countries or to countries which are clearly hostile to the U.S. So far as I know, there is a regulation on the books putting fairly tight controls on travel to ~~the~~ problem areas by Agency employees.

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